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Abstract 
The world is in the early stages of what will be the greatest health 
cnsls in modem times. Millions of people-most of them in the 
world's poor countries-are infected with HIV. The vast majority of 
these people will suffer and die from AIDS. The extent of this 
problem presents profound moral and ethical questions for the 
world's wealthy people and countries, for it is they who are most 
able to assist the poor in addressing this tragedy. What is more, the 
spread of HIV and AIDS poses m句or threats to the interests of the 
developed countries. In short, HIV/AIDS presents the world with 
some of the most profound moral and practical challenges it has ever 
faced during peacetime. Nevertheless, developed countries have 
been very slow in responding to the international dimensions of this 
problem. They have instead focused on the relatively few people 
within their own borders at risk for HIV or suffering from AIDS , 
seemingly unwilling to recognize the greater challenges posed by the 
global spread of f宜V. The rhetoric has started to change, but the 
developed countries have not backed this rhetoric with the 
substantial new and additional funds to assist the poor countries in 
coping with and reversing the HIV/AIDS epidemic. This essay 
examines this moral and practical problem in the context of North-
South relations. lt serves to high Iight the need for much more 
international assistance to combat HIV/AIDS in the developing 
world 
1. Introduction 
The world is in the early stages of what will be the greatest health 
crisis since the advent of modern medical technologies. Millions of 
people-particularly people in many of the world's poor countries-
are infected with HIV. The vast majority of these people wiU go 
I Thc authors wish to thank thc intcmational joint rcscarch programme of thc Centre for 
Public Policy, Lingnan Univcrsity, for assistance in facilitating rcscarch for this essay 
without modem medical intervention or substantial treatment, 
Ieading rapidly to AIDS . The extent of this problem presents 
profound moral and ethical questions for the wo r1 d's wealthy people 
and countries , for it is they who are most able to assist the poor in 
managing and reversing this human tragedy. What is more, the 
spread of HIV and AIDS poses m句or threats to the national interests 
of the world's economically developed countries. In short, 
HIV/ AIDS presents the wo r1d with much more than a seemingly 
insurmountable crisis in health; it also presents it with some of the 
most profound moral and practical chaIIenges it has ever faced 
during peacetime 
Over the last century or more, there has been a gradual shi丘 m
global attitudes toward interstate obligation. Govemments have 
come to regard many forms of intemational assistance as obligatory 
For example, when famine strikes, it is generally recognized that the 
developed countries have an obligation to respond because they have 
a surplus of food and the means to deliver it to those who are 
starving. The degree to which this obligation is fulfilled varies , of 
course, but few now argue that no such obligation exists . Similar 
obligations arise in other issue areas, for example with regard to 
natural disasters and adverse environmental changes, and 
governments of the rich countries (and indeed many of their private 
citizens and nongovernmental groups) respond accordingly with 
increasing frequency, robustness, and speed. HIV/AIDS presents the 
wo r1 d with such a problem requiring assistance from the wo r1d's 
wealthy. 
Nevertheless, developed countries have been very slow in 
responding to the international dimensions of the HIV/AIDS 
problem. They have instead focused on the relatively few people 
within their own borders at risk for HIV or sllffering from AIDS , 
seemingly unwilling to recognize the greater challenges posed by the 
global spread of HIV. The rhetoric has started to change一-the United 
States , for example, has identified this problem as a potential threat 
to U.S. national interests and has pledged some funds in recent 
years2 -but the developed cOllntries have not backed this rhetoric 
with substantial new and additional funds to assist the poor countries 
in coping with and reversing the HIV/AIDS epidemic. That is, while 
accepting a responsibility to respond to other crises that are 
2 1t is not at all clear whether these funds will bc new and additional or, as s巴巴ms more likely, 
mostly taken from other assistance programs 
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insllrmountable by those countries experiencing them, the developed 
wo r1 d has done relatively little to help the poor cOllntries address the 
problem of HlV/AIDS. This not only runs counter to established 
obligations betwe巳n North and South, but defies many commonly 
accepted moral principles crying out for greater intemational 
distributive justice, contributes to tremendolls human suffering, and 
harms the national interests of poor and rich countries alike 
ThllS , the developed countries ought to act much more robustly 
to assist the poor countries of the world in their fight agaínst AIDS 
because doing so would comply with now accepted standards of 
intemational obligation, promote many ethical principles shared by 
civilized peoples, and promote the national interests of those aided 
αnd (importantly, from a political perspective) those providing the 
aid 
ln this essay we address these issues. The next section of the 
essay looks more c10sely at the HIV/AIDS problem for the 
developing world. Explicit in this discussion is the c1ear need and 
demand for aid from the world's wealthy countries to address the 
problem, and implicit is the moral obligation of the wor1d's wealthy 
to aid the world's poor in doing so. The third section examines the 
historical evolution of developed countries' obligations of 
intemational distributive justice toward the wo r1d's poor countries 
We argue that such obligation has increased over tim己， and suggest 
that it ought to continue in the context of HIV/AIDS. ln the fourth 
section of the essay we undertake an analysis of the HIV/AIDS in 
light of historical obligations between the wo r1d's rich and poor, 
bearíng in mind the very important prudential reasons for actualizing 
intemational distributive justice in this contex t. We conclude with 
some thoughts on this difficult topic 
2. HIV/AIDS: A Problem Demanding Global Justice 
It is hard to overstate the dimensions of the problem of 1-宜V/AIDS in 
the developing world, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. World 
wide, AIDS has already killed more than 22 million people and left 
more than 13 million children orphaned, according to the Joint 
United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS , more commonly referred to 
as UNAIDS. 3 Approximately 36 million people are cu汀ently
3 UNA lDS, "Report on the Global H1V/A lDS Epidcmic," 2000, availablc at <h口p :l.八叭\"\Y
unaids . orglepid巴mic_ update/report/Epi_rcport.pd f> 
infected with HIV, and an average of 16,000 new infections is 
believed to occur daily.4 
In looking at the demographics of H1V infection, much 
emphasis has been placed (appropriately) on geography. Although 
comprising only about 10% of the world's population, sub-Saharan 
Africa has bome a hugely disproportionate share of the worId's 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Approximately 70% of the world's HIV-
positive adults and 80% of the world's HIV -positive children live in 
this region and the adult prevalence rate of HIV is eight times that of 
the rest of the world (8.8% compared to the 1.1 % average world 
wide).5 And the situation is not improving. Ofthe world's estimated 
5.3 million new infections in 2000, 3.8 million, or 71 %, occu叮ed in 
sub-Saharan Africa, compared, for example, to the 45 ,000 new 
infections (Iess than 1 % of the world-wide new infections) in North 
America. 6 Other developing and transition states also have huge 
numbers of infected individuals. As UN Secretary General Kofi 
Anan pointed 0肘， India will soon have the highest number of 1召V­
positive people of any country in the world, and by 2005 China and 
India together a~e expected to have more than 10 million HIV-
pos1Ílve cltlzens.' 
Although geography is a tremendously important way of 
viewing the world's AIDS pandemic, an equaIly important, and 
complementary, vantage is provided through the lens of poverty. A 
stunning 95 percent of the world's HIV-positive people /ive in low-
income countries. o In fact, poverty is currently the single most 
powerfuI risk factor in deterrnining who among the world's people 
are most vulnerable to HIV. '.1 It is also therefore not surprising that 
Africa, with its average GDP of $560 per person , compared to Asia's 
meager $730 and Latin America's $4,230, has suffered so 
disproportionately (though these numbers also add urgency to the 
warnings that Asia is seriously at risk as well) . \0 
4 Individllal Mcmbcrs of the Fac lI lty of Harvard Univcrsity, "Conscnsus St..'ltement on 
Antirctroviral Trcatmcnt for AlDS in Poor Countrics ," 4 April 2001 , p. 3 
5 UNAIDS , "Rcport on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic." 
6 UNAIDS , "Rcport on the Global HIV/A1DS Epidemic." 
7 Secretary General Kofi Anar丸 "Remarks to the United States Chamber of Commerce," 
Washington, DC , 1 June 2001 
8 lndividual Members ofthc Facu!ty ofHarvard University, p. 3 
9 Gcrald Stine, AIDS Update 2000 (Upper Saddle Rivcr, NJ: Prentic巴 Hall ， 2000), p. 11 
10 Thcsc figurcs are takcn from thc web pagc of USAID , "USAID CP FY2000: AFR Regiona! 
Repo口" availablc at <http://\叭叭v.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/afr/afr _ ovcr. htm!> 
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The combination of poverty and HIV creates a terrible 
downward spiral in poor cOllntries whereby poverty provides many 
of the conditions that facilitate the spread of HIV. Poverty leads to 
poor health conditions generally, including the lack of treatment of 
conditions, such as sexually transmitted diseases, that make 
individuals more susceptible to HIV infection. Poverty also creates 
exploitative working conditions that have been shown to foster the 
spread of HIV infection both in women-who are forced through the 
lack of other economic opportunities into formal and informal 
prostitution-and men-who leave their families to find work 
thereby incurring increased docllmented risks generally through 
factors inherent in migratory work and specifically through trades 
inc1uding trucking and mining. 11 
As ilIness and death due to HIV infection spread through 
communities, poverty creates a situation where every aspect of the 
disease一-from treatment of the ill to the creation of orphans through 
the death of parents and guardians to the challenges of implementing 
prevention programs-create strains on already overtaxed social 
systems. When people become sick, families are forced to spend 
precious resources on any treatment options they can find. Sickness 
in adult family members means they cannot eam an income, grow or 
provide food , or care for their children. The eventuaI death of adults 
Ieaves children, many of whom have already been pulled from 
school because of the inability to pay schooI fees , with no one to 
care for them. They, and adult women survivors, may be forced into 
sex work to provide for themselves and their families , thereby 
multiplying not only their own suffering, but also the transmission of 
HIV. 口
The devastation experienced within and among families is 
mirrored in the communities within which they live. In poor 
countries that already suffer from a lack of forma lIy educated 
professionaIs in education, health care, the military, and the 
government bureaucracy, AIDS has been devastating. For instance, 
11 An exccllent and more e:-.:tcnsivc discussion of these interactions of povc口:y and HIV can bc 
found in Brook K. Bakcr, "South African AIDS : lmpacts of G1obalization, Pharrnaceutical 
Aparthcid, and Lcgal Activism," 3 April 2001 , pp. 4-7, available at <http:// 
globaltrcatmcntacccss .org> 
12 An excc l1ent snapshot of thc tragic situations crcatcd by HIV in sub-Saharan Africa is 
providcd in a Publitzer prize-winning scries by Mark Schoofs, "AIDS: The Agony of Afric丸"
Parts 1 心 ， Villagc Voi白 ， 9 Novcmbcr 1999-4 January 2000. AvailabJc at <http ://W\叭V
vi l1agcvoice.comlissucs/9952 . schoofs .html> 
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it has been estimated that a country with an HIV prevalence rate of 
30% \Vould Iose between 3 and 7 percent of its health care workers 
annually to A1DS. 13 The ranks of teachers are similar1y being 
depleted. 1n Zambia, in one year (1 998) 1,300 teachers died-two 
thirds of the amount that are trained annually.14 UNAIDS Director 
Peter Piot has commented that "H1V does to society what it does to 
the human body. It undermines the very institutions that are meant 
to defend society-its doctors, its teachers .,, 15 
A further aggravating factor to the pove吐y of the world's 
poorer countries is the staggering extemal debt they owe to wea1thier 
countries and to the Wo r1d Bank. Again, sub-Saharan Africa serves 
as a striking, though by no means isolated example. According to a 
repo吐 by the debt relief NGO Jubilee 2000, sub-Saharan Africa 
owes $231 billion to its creditors, which breaks down to $406 per 
African. Foreign aid cannot keep pace with the deb t: for every 
dollar received in foreign aid in 1999, the region paid back $1. 51 in 
debt. And the opportunity cost of this debt servicing is equalIy great 
Sub-Saharan Africa spends twice as much on debt servicing as it 
does on health care. 1G 
The relationship of the developed wo r1d to the devastating 
pove吋y and aggravating circumstances of the developing world is 
complex. At the very least, we may easily argue that the developed 
world has stood in the way of the developing world's efforts to soIve 
A1DS and other health-related problems in the most cost-effective 
\Vays possible. The developed \Vorld has, for example, repeatedly 
taken positions elevating patent protections (sometimes at levels 
even stronger than those prescribed by intemational treaties) above 
public hea1th in developing countries . Brazil , South Africa and 
Thailand are among the countries that have been overtly pressured 
by the United States government not to take measures to bolster their 
abilities to obtain or produce cheaper generic dmgs or even, in the 
D \Vorld Bank, "Difficult Hcalth Policy Choiccs in a Scvcrc AIDS Epidcmic," in Conjronting 
AIDS: F /l blic Friorities in σ G/obσ/ Epidemic (\Vashington DC: \Vorld Bank, 1997) avaibble 
at <http﹒//\叭叭v . worldba叫<.org/aids-econ/arv/conf-aids-4/ch4-1 p2 .htm#T2> 
14 Norimitsu Onishi, "AIDS Cuts Swath Through Africa's Teachers," New York Times , 14 
August 2000 
的 Peter Piot, UNAIDS Press Re\ease, 7 May 2000 
16 A I1 of these figures are taken from JlIbilee 2000 Coalitior丸 "Eïe of the Needle: African 
Debt Report," No\'cmbcr 2000 available at <http ://w\Vw .j ubilec20001lk.orglrcports/ 
nccdlc.html> 
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case of Thailand, to monitor drug prices. 17 Various other 
intemational leaders have also public\y and privately shown their 
support for patent regimes, regardless of the devastating effect they 
may have for people unable to afford the prices set by the branded 
(as opposed to generic) pharmaceutical industry. In the case of 
South Africa, for example, although the United States took a more 
vocal position in opposing the 1997 amendment to the Medicines 
and Related Substances Control Act that would make it easier to 
purchase affordable drugs, European countries als.~ exerted pressure 
on behalf of the branded pharmaceutical industry.10 
Some would argue that the relationship goes deeper, and that 
the world's wealthy countries' culpability goes even furthe r. 
According to this line of argument it is the neo-liberal policies of the 
world's richest countries that are at least partially responsible for the 
problems of the world's poorest countries. These policies inc\ude 
the maintenance of exploitative colonial pattems of ownership; the 
destructive re-orientation of economies to produce low-cost exports 
at the expense of the environment and human and labor rights; 
liberalizing currency exchanges and financial markets resulting in 
currency devaluations, market volatility and out f1ow of capital; and 
the imposition of harmful structural adjustment programs that are 
disproportionately borne by the poorest in society.19 Taken together, 
these policies may be responsible for, and almost certainly at least 
contribute to, the inability of developing countries to solve their 0 \Vl1 
economic and social problems 
叫fhatever level of culpability one assigns to the developed 
countries , it is clear that the developing countries wi l1 need outside 
resources to help solve the growing AIDS crises they face. There 
have been a number of promising recent developments. Uganda, 
Senegal and Thailand have been held up as international examples of 
countries that have successfully lowered or held low transmission 
rates , and in April 2001 , African leaders held a summit in Abuja, 
Nigeria, where they pledged to spend a significant proportion of 
17 Scc, for cxample Tina Roscnburg, "Look at Brazil," New Y，ο rk Times Magazine, 28 January 
2001 
1X Sce Europcan Union Ambassador Erwon Fou巳r巴's letter to Dr. O. Shisana" 24 Novcmber 
1997 available at <h位p :l/\\"\\ "\\".cptech.org/ip/hcalth/eu. fourc.html> 
19 AII of thesc conditions (and scveral morc) are d巳vcloped in thc context ofthe casc of South 
Africa in Bake丸 "South African AIDS." 
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their nationaI budgets on AIDS. 20 Yet, it is impo口ant to remember 
that these budgets themselves are tiny compared to those of 
developed countries . And even in Uganda, where infection rates 
have been cut in half over ten years-an extremely impressive 
achievement-they sti lI remain at Ieast ten times higher than world-
wide average prevalence rates .21 PoliticaI commitment on the part of 
developing countries is clearly a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for ending the AIDS pandemic in the developing world 
3. A History of Intcrnational Obligation: 
When Need Arises, the Wealthy Ought to Act 
Obligations between rich and poor within societies, particular!y 
wealthy ones, have been established and institutionalized over the 
last centurγor more. Social welfare systems, whereby resources are 
redistributed from the more affluent in society to those who are poor, 
are now commonplace in almost alI economicalIy developed 
societies . In recent decades一-especialIy since the mid-twentieth 
century-these obligations have extended to international relations. 
The worId's wealthy countries now give substantial amounts of 
money to the poorer countries, often for self-interested reasons, but 
also because it is now viewed as the right thing to dO. 22 
International Obligation and Distributive Justice 
There are many philosophical-ethical arguments for the rich 
countries of the world to adopt a greater obligation toward the 
wor!d's poor, and specificalIy for them to provide emergency 
assistance, development aid, and additional money and technology 
to help them deal with many problems they face . These arguments 
fall under the nlbric of intemational distributive justice, fairness and 
equity. Among these conceptions, at least six are germane and usefuI 
in helping us better think about obligations between countries, 
20 For one account of the Abuja summit sce John Donnelly, "Leaders Vow to Combat Africa 
AIDS Epidemic," Boston Globe , 29 April 200 I 
~ I For a description of Uganda's success , see Alex Duval Smith, "Faith , Hope and Charity," 
The Independent (London) , 2 December 2000. 
22 Scc, for examplc, David H. Lumsdaine， λ10ml 的sion in International Politics: The Foreign 
Aid Regime. 1 夕49-1989 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Alain Noel and Jean-
Philippe 1l1erien, "From Domcstic to Intemational Justice : 1l1e Welfare State and Foreign 
Aid ," Internationdl Organization 49 , 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 523-刃 ; and LO l1 is-Marie Imbea l1 , 
Donor AiιThe Determinants 01 Development Allocations. to Third World Countries: A 
Comparntive Analysis (Nc叭. Y ork: Petcr Lang, 1989) 
s 
particularly between richer and poorer ones?3 These conceptions are 
prcmiscd on rights , causality and responsibility, utilitarianism , 
Kantian ethics , Rawlsian justice, and impartialíty.24 
From a human rights perspective, individuals have inherent 
rights , such as mIn llTIUm nutrition , ' freedom from torture , and so 
f。此h， simply because they are human beings. Henry Shue argues 
that individuals have at least the right to subsistence, for without it 
no other rights can be exercised?5 HIV and of course AIDS , without 
the treatments that are now far more expensive than the vast majority 
of sufferers can afford , certainly deny people this most basic right. If 
the developed countries care about the "basic" rights that Shue and 
others argue for, they ought to be much more forthcoming with aid 
and technology (i .e" pharmaceuticals and treatment strategies) 
necessary for survival in this context. 
Conceptions of international obligation, fairness and equity 
based on causality or responsibility assert, simply, that those 
responsible for causing harm are responsible for ending and 
ultimately righting that wrong. According to Shue, "the obligation to 
restore those whom one has hanned is acknowledged even by those 
who reject any general obligation to help strangers. [T]his is because 
one ought even more fundamentally to do no harm in the first 
place." 2G To be sure, acquiring HIV is often the responsibility of 
those who have 此 27 but even here the Northbears some 
responsibility. Developed countries are not doing enough to finance 
education campaigns and the promotion of women's rights, for 
example, which could reduce the spread of HIV. More obviously, 
they have some responsibility with regard to AIDS. There funding 
for trcatmcnt is miniscule rclativc to thc scalc of thc problem and 
23 Hcrc \\'c do not prctend to takc on thc burdcns of philosophical excg巳sis ， Mathew Patcrson 
is one of thc scholars 叫10 has \\Tittcn on this topic in the em 'ironmcntal context. Sce Paterson, 
"Intcrmtioml Justice and Global Wanning," in The Ethical Dimcnsions ofGlobal Change ， 巳d .
Barry Holdcn (London : Macmilbn Prcss, 1996), pp. 181-20 1. For more about thcsc 
conccptions of obligation and justicc, in thc context of global cnvironmental change, see Paul 
G . Harris , lnternσtlOnσ1 Eqllity and Glohal Enνiroll ll1cntal Po /i tics (Aldershot: Ashgate Prcss , 
forthcoming 2001) 
24 This typology mirrors Paterson's framework. Sce also, for example, Chris Brown, 
lnternational Reiatiolls Theory (Oxford: Columbia Uni\叫sity Prcss, 1992) 
25 Hcn門， Shuc, Basic Rights (Princcton : Princctoll Univcrsity Prc品 ， 1996). 
26 Hcnry Shuc, "Equity in an Intcrmtioml Agrccmcnt 011 Climatc Changc," Eqllity and Social 
Cοnsidcrations Related to Climate Change, eds 刊chard Samson Odingo et a l. (Nairobi 
ICIPE Scicnce Press, 1995), p. 386 
27 And oftcn it is no t. Hcmophiliacs and pcrsons \\'ho havc bcen forced to havc unprotccted 
scx arc among thosc 叫10 ar巴 clcarly in no 叭 ay rcsponsible for thcir misfortune 
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relative to their ability to help, and they are often obstacles to the 
lowering of drug prices essential to widespread treatment and 
prolongation of life for AIDS sufferers 
Altematively, utilitarians might argue that global benefits and 
burdens should be distributed in such a way as to achieve the 
greatest good-or reduce the largest amount of suffering-for the 
greatest number of individuals.28 Thus, the almost total emphasis by 
the rich countries of the world on I咀V/ AIDS among their own 
citizens, while commendable as far as it goes, does not go nearly far 
enough. The vast m句ority of suffering is in the world's poor 
countries; the utilitarian perspective would require that this suffering 
be addressed in a much more concerted fashion. 29 
From the Kantian perspective, people should be treated as ends 
in themselves, and certainly not as means to one's own ends.30 It is 
unfair to exploit other people because they would not freely choose 
to be exploited. Thus if the burdens of the free market global 
economic system and intemational patent rules are imposed on 
countries against their free will , those systems are not fair and 
equitable. If the global trading system as it exists now and as it is 
promoted by most of the world's developed countries exacerbates 
conditions leading to suffering from AIDS , it is exploitative and 
unJust 
A Rawlsian conception of what is a fair and equitable 
distribution of intemational burdens might derive from conceptions 
of self-interest decided in an "original position" behind a "veil of 
ignorance. ,, 31 It is doubtful that the people of the weaIthy countries, 
let alone others, would choose the existing state of affairs regarding 
HIV/ AIDS if they were unsure where they wOllld be bom, into what 
economic circllmstances, and with or withollt HIV/ AIDS (i.e. , 
whether they would begin life as an "AIDS baby"). Also from a 
2g Cf. M. Wamock, ed. , Mill: Utilitarianism and Other Writing.l' (Gbsgow: Collins, 1962); 
, 
Je附叮 Ben叫叫tham叭n， Anh扣n川1trodl叫f叫1 tωo t的hc P仟)，νri川nn
and H.L.A. Hart, (London: Athlone Press , 1970) 
29 Of coursc, if one thinks that the wcll bcing and livcs ofpcoplc in thc rich countrics is vastly 
more important-that is, if the utility cxpcrienccd by onc pcrson in, say, the United States is 
greater than that of many people in, say, South Africa一this argument is not ve可 strong. We 
dOllbt, and certainly hope, that many people would want to support this view ve可 strongly，
however, at least from an ethical perspective (as opposed to a political one) 
30 Inunanuel Kant, The Moral Law (London: Hutchinson, 1948) 
31 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univcrsity Press, 1971). Rawls 
argues that his theory does not apply much to intemational rclations . Ncvertheless, severaI 
scho \ars have arglled othcrwise , notably Charles Beitz, Political Theory and Intcrnational 
Re1，σtions (Princcton: Princcton University Press, 1979) 
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Rawlsian-l ike perspective, ineqllalities in distriblltion are acceptable 
insofar as they benefit the least advantaged in society, because that is 
what those in the original position would choose. Hence, for 
example, it is perfectly acceptable that phannaceutical companies 
make profits (vvhich are, after all, an incentive to create the drugs 
necessary for treating AIDS and its related maladies), but not if this 
comes on the back of the least advantaged in the world. This 
suggests, to extend the example, that drug makers should not make 
their large profits at the expense of the millions suffering from 
HIV/AIDS in the developing world, and it further implies that 
wealthy governments ought to at least do more to help those 
sufferers pay for the drugs. 
A final philosophical-ethical perspective (there many more) on 
intemational obligation and distributive justice is premised on 
llnpa吋iality . 32 It requires that we assess what is fair based on what is 
reasonable. It is not reasonable to expect an equal relationship 
between the United States and, say, Nigeria (nor, which is apt in this 
case, between Pfizer and South Africa). The United States should aid 
the poorest countries to cope with HIV and AIDS , using the words 
of Chris Brown in a different context，市ot because it is in the United 
States' interest to do so but because justice as impartiality suggests 
that the case for such aid cannot be reasonably denied." .J.J 
It seems to us that these arguments for greater North-South 
obligation are persuasive, particular1y when combined. That 芯， there 
are many ethical arguments favoring greater action on 1宜V/AIDS in 
poor countries by the wo r1d's wealthy countries; the weight of moral 
argument is rea lIy quite profound. This is especialIy the case with 
regard to callsality and responsibility. Thus, insofar as the developed 
countries are complicit in suffering experienced in the developing 
world , the obligation to act is much stronger. If there is an accepted 
obligation to help those suffering from adverse natural events 
(earthquakes, famine) , it seems self evident that, where there is some 
responsibility for harm , the obligation is even stronger. Hence, 
insofar as the rich countries contribute to , say, global environmental 
changes that harm others (see the discussion below), they must act to 
end that harm and provide comfort to those who have suffered from 
it. Extending this argument, insofar as the developed 
32 8rian Barη\ ./us ficc as I lI1parfia!i ty (Oxford: Oxford Univcrsity Prcss, 1995) 
33 Brown, p. 18 1. 
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we think, through its in f1 uence on the global economic system, for 
exampJe-it is obliged to provide aid to mitigate and hopefu l1y end 
that suffering. 
Obligations of Intcrnntional Aid: A History of Evolving Norms 
Past and contemporary international history provides us with 
examples of greater acceptance by the world's wealthier countries of 
obl igation to aid the \Vor1 d's poorer countries . There has been an 
historical trend toward greater intemational obligation (justice, 
fairness , equity) in intemational law and international relations 
between the world's rich and poor countries and peoples. The logic 
of this obligation is quite simple: A problem requiring action arises 
in which human beings are experiencing great suffering. The 
problem is suftìciently immense that those suffering from it cannot 
implement soIutions or mitigation measures without help. Solutions 
to the problem or measures to mitigate the reslllting human suffering 
exist, and those soIutions and measures-money, expertise, 
technology, etc.-are readily available in countries with the abiIity 
to supply them (most often the \VorId's wea1thy countries). Therefore, 
those with the ability to provide the necessary aid have an obIigation 
to administer 泣， even if they are not directly compIicit in causing the 
problem-but much more profoundly ifthey are 
Before looking more directly at the situation with regard to 
HIV/ AIDS , here we look at three areas where international 
obligation bεtween the worId's rich and poor has grown. This 
illustrates the contemporary international context of obligation and 
aid .3-l We believe that the trend that is illllstrated is indicative of 
what ought to happen in the case of HIV/AIDS . Indeed, there are 
some indications that movement in this direction has started. 
Disaster Reliej" Obligalion to Respond to Natura! Disaslers 
Many of the world's people I ive in places that are prone to natural 
disasters fro111 events ranging from hllrricanes and cycJones to 
earthquakes and vo1canic emptions. These c1 isasters can be severe, 
leading to many lost lives, extensive damage to infrastnlcture 
3~ Th ese are some of the major examples. Others can be fOllnd, sllch as the obligation to 
provide humanitarian relief-and at times to even intervene militarily-in times of civic, 
ethnic and interstate con f1i ct. See, for exampl e, Thomas G. \Veiss and Cindy Collins, 
Hll1 l1anilarian Challenges and Jntervenlion (Bolllder: \Vestvicw Press, 1996) and Michael J 
Smith, "Humanitarian Int巴 rvention : An Overv ie叭， of the Eth ical Issucs," in Jocl H. Roscnthal , 
cd . ， 的hics and 扣ternσtiona! A伊7irs (Washington : GcorgctO\\11 Uni\'crsity Press, 1999) 
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necessary for economic vital i 旬， and widespread human suffì巳nng
Most of these events are very difficult to prepare for, especially in 
the cases of poor countries experiencing poverty on . a daily basis. 
That obligation to aid those countries and peoples exists seems self-
evident at this point in history. Thus, when Turkey experiences a 
111句 or earthquake, or when Honduras is hit by a hurricane, or when a 
volcano erupts in the Philippines, governments act by providing 
direct assistance or money necessary to cope with the resulting 
destruction and suffering. While reactions vary in magnitude and 
form , they are usually almost immediate. And, while the wealthy 
countries act upon the obligation most robustly because they have 
the resources to do so, the feeling of obligation is often also felt 
aClltely even among the poorer countries. Indeed, while we read 
editorials in the developed countries calling for faster and more 
robust responses following natural disasters, it would be a rare 
editorial arguing that we have no obligation to act. Doing so is so 
beyond the pale as to be unthinkable-or at least un-sayable. The 
international obligation for the wealthy to provide aid to the poor-
and often the not so poor-in times of natural disaster, while not a 
requirement in intemational law, is almost unassailable in the 
international norms ofthe modern world 
While the intent here is to show the evolution of obligations of 
international distributive justice over time, and to suggest that this 
evolution ought to obtain in the case of HIV/AIDS , we can find 
direct parallels to the HIV / AIDS problem in each case. For example, 
what does obligation to provide relief following natural disaster have 
to do with HIV/AIDS? Some argue that HIV/AIDS is much like a 
natural disaste r. HIV probably began in the apes and was transmitted 
to humans who lived among them. It was , according to this 
conception, nobody's faul t. But, as the case of disaster relief shows, 
even ifthe lVealthy countries are not atfau缸， obligαtion to αid exists 
Famine Relief Obligation to Feed the Starving 
Before the last century, when countries suffered from famine, people 
in the rich countries were no doubt saddened and perhaps prayed for 
the starving, but there was little they were willing to do (famine was 
sometimes not far from their own doorsteps) and even less they 
cOllld do (by the time aid reached those in need by sailing ship, it 
would probably be too late). However, as the developed countries 
began to experience food surpluses, and as technologies improved 
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for moving goods around the world, a new international obligation 
developed: Those countries with a food surplus have an obligation to 
aid those sllffering from famine. 35 The details and degree of this 
obl igation were and remain sllbject to some debate, but the basic 
obligation is now almost sacrosanct. The rich countries cannot 
ignore famine and starvation, and they must act to feed those 
suffering from them. (The practical solution is of course to aid them 
in the long term to prevent future famines , but this obligation is not 
yet highly developed.) 
This new obligation to distribute food to those suffering from 
famine is today visible by airlifts of food to those experiencing 
famine in the developing world. But this international obligation is 
so great that govemments have felt obl iged to act upon it even when 
their national interests would clearly suffer from doing so. For 
example, during widespread famine in the Soviet Union dllring the 
early 192缸， the United States spent massive amounts of money and 
expended other aid to feed the starving mi l1 ions there. This aid was 
sent despite extant hatred of the new Bolshevik regime, and even 
despite Lenin's acknowledgement that, without aid , the revolution 
would fai l. Failure of the revolution was precisely what the United 
States wanted, of COllrse, and some Americans argued that the 
famine ought to be a l10wed to continue in order to bring down the 
communist regime. But the United States acted nevertheless . Robert 
McElroy has shown that U.S. jllstifications for providing famine 
re1ief to Russia were not based on benefits for U.S. farmers or for 
other self-interested reasons , but instead because the new obligation 
to provide aid to those suffering from famine was already too strong 
to ignore. 36 
Similar arguments are being made today with regard to severe 
food shortages in North Korea. The largest amollnt of famine aid to 
North Korea一-headed by a regime that the United States hardly 
wishes to see remain in power-comes from the United States 
Jndeed , it would not be far fetched to arglle that the United States is 
largely responsible for keeping the country a\ive with its aid . There 
are of course practical reasons for providing the aid-a sudden 
3S S間， for example, Jovica Patmogic, "Sorne Rcflections on Hurnanitari:m Principles 
Applicablc in Relief Actions ," in Christophcr Swinarski, ed., Studies and Essays on 
lnfcrnational Humanifarian Lmv (Geneva: Martinlls Nijhoff PlIblications, 1984) 
36 Robcrt W. McElroy, Mοrσlity and Americσn Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton 
Univcrsity Press, 1992), pp. 57-87. Sec al so Be吋amin M. Weissman , Hcrbert Hoover and 
Fami l7 c Rcliefto 
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breakdown in North Korean society and government could spill over 
into conflict on the Korean peninsula-but it is in any case 
extraordinarily difficult to argue that the people of North Korea 
should be allowed to starve to death as a means for bringing about 
political change there, just as they did in the 1920s. 37 Such 
arguments nm Up against the established international norm of 
famine relie f. Hence the continuing efforts to bring down the regime 
in a more humane fashion. Similarly, in Afghanistan, where the 
Taliban is brutalizing the Afghan people, the United States and 
others have chosen to continllC food aid, and thc United States now 
even provides food aid to govemment-held parts of Sudan, despite 
the government's war on its own people. Indeed, recent efforts to end 
UN sanctions against Iraq are often about the suffering of the Iraq i 
people. The Iraq i government is to blame, to be sure, but the 
practical effects are hunger and disease in Iraq. Hence, things cannot 
remain as they are, despite all arguments to the contrary. Even the 
powerful advocates of keeping the sanctions on Iraq as they have 
been for the last decade, despite having some very good arguments, 
are looking for new ways of punishing and containing the brutal 
Iraqi regime without causing suffering among its people 
To be sure, much famine and starvation is the consequence of 
government action (or intentional inaction), as demonstrated 
strongly by widespread famine from Mao's so-called Great Leap 
Forward and, more intentionally, Pol Pot's despicable policies 
toward the Cambodian people, or the policy of the current Sudanese 
government toward its rebellious South.38 And many famines are at 
least an indirect conseqllence of governments' failures to prepare for 
them. In thc case of HIV/AIDS , many argue that it is the fault of 
their governments . They are the ones to blame, so the rich need not 
feel an obl igation to provide aid. But the case of famine relief shows 
that even where national governme;的 αre to blame for famine αnd 
starvatlO刀， an internαtional obligation to aid those sujJering exists if 
that is practicable 
37 \Vhcn askcd why hc thought thc Unitcd Statcs was providing food aid to No叫1 Korca, that 
COllntry's conslll-gcneral to Hong Kong, Ri To Sop, told me on 11 Jllne 2001 , "{t's 
hllmanitarian" and "Bccallsc wc arc hllman beings ." Th is is a profound asscssment, given his 
country's animosity toward thc Unitcd States govc口凹1cnt
3S lllC cascs jllSt citcd arc of COllrsc cxa ll1plcs whcrc providing aid was and is dccidedly 
difficult for practical rcasons or bccausc it ran up against othcr intcrcsts dear to those who 
could potcntially provide aid 
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Environmental Change: COmmO l1 but Differentiαted Responsibility 
The world is experiencing many environmental problems, with the 
most acute effects being felt in the poorest cOllntries. 1ndeed, 
environmental changes-ranging from water poIllltion and shortages 
to desertification, air polllltion and climate change一-are placing 
increasing strain on developing economies, and leading to 
tremendous human suffering. 1n recent decades, and particularIy in 
the last one, the worId's governments have come to recognize their 
responsibilities toward the environment. More to the point, the 
developed countries have increasingly been willing to aid the poorer 
countries in their efforts to combat adverse environmental changes, 
and the wealthy of the world have started to acknowledge-and act 
upon-their responsibility for many ofthese problems. 39 
Global warming, and resulting climatic changes, is a 
particularIy salient case in point. Among the key principles of the 
1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) was 
the notion of "common but differentiated responsibility," whereby 
the economicaIly developed countries wOllld take the lead in 
addressing the problem of climate change, specifically excluding 
developing countries from binding limitations on emissions of the 
greenhouse gases that lead to global warming. 40 The developed 
cOllntries are disproportionately responsible for historical 
greenhollse gas emissions, and they have the greatest capacity to 
act. 41 Thus the Convention makes few demands on the much less 
responsible and usualIy much less capable developing countries 
As a principle of international environmentallaw, common but 
differentiated responsibility evolved from the notion of "common 
heritage of mankind" in the UN Convention on the Law ofthe Sea,42 
39 Scc J-brris , /nlernσlional Eq /l ity a l1d Glohal Environmenlal l'o!ilic.\' 
4(' FCCC, Prcamblc, A口s . 3 and 4. For a more detailed discllssion of thc common bllt 
diffcrentiated responsibility principle in this context, sce Paul G. Harris, "Common bllt 
Diffcrentiated Responsibility : Thc Kyoto Protocol and United Statcs Policy," Environmenlal 
Lmv.!ollrl1σ17 ， 1 (1999) : 27-4R; and Harris丸， /，扣nlcI
l'ρlilics. 
41 See FCCC, Prcambk, \、 here the Convention notes, inler alia , that "the largest sharc of 
historical and current g1oba1 emissions of greenhollse gascs has originated in deve10ped 
cOllntries. " 
4~ United Nations Convention on thc Law ofthe Sea, 10 December 1982, 21 ILM 1262 (1 982) 
This concept datcs to the 1950s, and was a1so integrated into the 1979 Moon Agreement 
Agreement Goveming the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestia1 Bodies, 18 
ILM 1434 (1 979) . See Frank Biermanr丸 "'Common Conccrn of H lImankind': The Emergencc 
of a New Concept of Intermtional Environmcnta1 Law," Archiv des Volkerrechts 34, 4 
(Dcccmber 1996), pp .426-481 
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as well as the intemational designation of certain areas (Antarctica 
and the deep seabed) and resollrces (e.g. , whales) 的花ommon
interests" of hllmankind.4J The UN General Assembly went further 
by recognizing the earth's climate system as a "common concern" of 
humankind, indicating a "certain higher status inasmuch as it 
emphasizes the potential dangers underlying the problem of global 
warming and ozone depletion [and implying] that international 
governance regarding those 'concerns' is not only necessary or 
desired bllt rather essential for the sllrvival of humankind. ,,4-l 
Bcaring in mind that the climate is of such crucial "common 
concem" to humankind, it follows that there is a responsibility on the 
part of countries to protect it. This begs the question of who is 
responsible. The answer derives from each country's historical 
responsibility for atmospheric pollution, its level of economic 
development, and its capability to act. This was suggested by 
Principle 23 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, which stated that it 
is essential to consider "the extent of the applicability of standards 
which are valid for the most advanced countries but which may be 
inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for developing 
countries." 的 The principle of common but differentiated 
responsibi1ity is described succinctly in Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development 
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to 
conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the 
Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to 
global environmental degradation, States have common bllt 
differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the 
intemational pursllit of sustainable development in view of the 
~3C f. Pn.:amblcs ofthc 1959 Antarctic Trcaty (402 UNTS 71) and thc 1946 International 
Convcntion on thc Rcgulation of Whaling (1 61 UNTS 72), and thc UN Gcneral Assembly 
Rcsolution on thc Ql1cstion of thc Rcscrvation Exclusively for Pcacef111 Purposcs of the Sca-
Bcd and the Occan Floor, and thc Subsoil 111crcof, Undcrlying thc l-l igh Scas Bcyond thc 
Limits of thc Prcscnt Nation:J.1 Jurisdictions , and thc Use of thcir Rcsourccs in thc Interests of 
Mankind, Rcsolution 2574 D (XXIV) of 15 Dcccmbcr 1969, reprintcd at 9 ILM 422 (1 970) 
Sce Bicnn~lI1n for a morc dctailcd discussion 
抖 Bienmnn， p. 431 (notc 9) 
~~ Dccbration of thc Unitcd Nations Confcrcncc on thc Human Environmcnt ( Stockholm 
Dcclaration), UN Doc. AlCONF.48/J 4 (1972) , Principlc 23 
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pressures their societies place on the global environment a.nd 
of the technologies and financial resources they command 刊
In addition to the FCCC, this principle was implicit in the 198~ 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,'" 
and it \Vas recognized in other important intemational 
undertakings.48 
All countries could suffer from climate change, although the 
poor countries of the \Vorld "Yill suffer most due to their vulnerable 
geographies and economies.'t:I What is more, it is the economically 
developed countries ofthe global North that have generated the most 
greenhouse gases since the advent of the Industrial Revolution , and 
they have thereby benefited from using the global atmosphere as _~ 
sink for the harmful byproducts of their economic developmen t. JV 
During the negotiations for the FCCC, developing countries were 
unified in emphasizing the historical responsibility of developed 
countries for c1 imate change. They agreed to participate in the 
c1 imate negotiations only on the condition that they not be required 
to accept any substantial commitments oftheir own.51 
The first basic principle of the FCCC states that "The Parties 
should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and 
46 Rio Dec\aration on Environmcnt and Dcvelopmcr哎， United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, UN Doc. NCONF. I 51151Rev. 1 (1992) , Principle 7 
47 Montrcal Protocol on Substances that Dep Iete the Ozonc Lay汀， 16 Septe ll1ber 1997, 26 
ILM 1550 (1987) 
4~ The principle of common but differentiated responsìbìlìty was acknowlcdgcd by, in/er alia , 
the UN General Assembly (see GA Rcsolution 44/228 [1989]) , and several climate related 
mcctings , incIuding: the Second \VorI d Climatc Conferenc巴， mectings of the Preparatory 
Committcc of thc United Nations Confcrcnce on Environment and Dcvelopmer哎， the Toronto 
Confcrencc Statcmer況， the Haguc Dec Iaration , and thc Noordwìjk Dec Iaration . Sce Philippe 
Sands, "Thc 'Grccnir頃， of lntcmational Law: Emcrging Princip Ics and Rules," Global Legal 
SI /l dies .Jollrnσ1 1, 2 (Spring 1994) 
叫 Robcrt T. Watson , Manlfa C Zinyo\\'cra and Richard H. Moss , cds ., Clin的Ic Changc 1夕的
fmpσc/s\ Adapfa/ions and 九1ifigafion of Climafe Chσnge (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press , 1996); IPCC Working Group 11 , "Summary for Policymakers , Climatc Change 2001 
Impacts , Adaptation, and Vulnerability" (Gcneva: IPCC Working Group 11，的 Fcbruary 2001 
draft); World Hcalth Organization , Climafc Changc and Hllman Hcalth (Gcncva. Wo rJ d 
Hcalth Organization Ofticc of Global Integratcd Environmcntal Health , 1996); 
Intergovemmental Panel on Climate Change, "甘1e Regional Impacts of Climatc Change: An 
Assessment of Vulnerability," Summary for Policymakers (1997) , <h前p ﹒//
1叭叭v . usgcrp.govlipcc/html/RISPM .html> .
50 Clive Ponting, A Green HislOry of /he World 們cw York: St. Marti的 Press ， 1991) , 
espcciaJly pp. 387-92 and 405-6 
51 Dclphine Boriorie and Jean 刊戶口 "E:x巴rcising Common but Differentiated Responsibility," 
in Irving M. Mintzcr and J.A. Leomrd , cds. , Negofiafing Climafc Change (Cambridge 
Cambridgc Univcrsity Press , 1994), pp. 83-84 
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future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties 
should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse 
effects thereof. ,, 52 Thus the FCCC recognizes that all countries are 
responsible for climate change, and all should endeavor to limit the 
pollution that causes it. However, following the common but 
differentiated responsibility principle, the treaty does not require 
developing countries to reduce their greenhouse gases. It would be 
unfair to expect poor countries to limit their economic development 
when the wealthy countries of the world are most responsible for 
present concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse gases-and the 
expected consequences of this pollution for the global climate in the 
next century.53 The common but differentiated responsibility 
principle was reaffirmed in 1995 in the "Berlin Mandate," whereby 
developed countries pledged to act first to reduce their greenhouse 
gas emlSSlons before reqUlrmg developing countries to do SO.5-l 
Subsequent negotiations regarding climate change, such as those 
leading to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, have been premised on the 
common but differentiated responsibility principle. The United 
States and other developed country parties to the FCCC accepted 
this standard (the new Bush administration's disturbing policies 
notwithstanding) because they knew developing countries would 
not-and in many cases could not一Iimit their greenhouse gas 
emissions and cope with climate change otherwise. 55 
The climate change regime is perhaps the most visible 
manifestation that the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility has been established in intemational environmental 
instruments negotiated over the last few decades. It is recognition 
that all countries are responsible for limiting damage to common 
5~ FCCC , Art. 3(1) 
53 On thc notions of faim ess and eqll ity in thc context of climate change and other 
intemationaI environmentaI iss lIes see, for cxample, hmcs P. Bruce, Hoesllng Lee, and Erik F 
Haites, cds., Climσte Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions (Cambridge 
Ca ll1bridgc Univcrsity Press, 1996), chapter 3; Richard Samson Odi月o et al., eds., Eqllity 
σnd Social Considerations Related to Climσte Change (Nairobi : ICIPE Science Press, 1994); 
PallI G. Harris , "Affluence, Poverty, and Ecology: Obligation, lnternational Relations, and 
Sustainable Development," Ethics and the Environment 2, 2 (1 997): 12日8 ; and Paul G 
Harris , "Environment, History and lnternational Justice," .!ollrnal ollnternafional Stlldies 40 
(July 1997): 1-33 
5.l Berlin Mandate, 6 JlIne 1995 , UN Doc. FCCC/CPII 995 /7/Add. 1 
的 C f. Group of Seven lndllstriaIizcd COllntrics (G-7) and Russia, "Final Commllniqué of the 
Dcn\'cr Summit ofthe Eight," Denver, 22 Ju1y 1997, paras. 14-17 
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global environmental areas, with the important qualification that the 
developed industriaIized countries should take on much greater 
responsibility in preventing and mitigating global po lIution, and 
indeed in helping developing countries in their own efforts to protect 
the global commons.56 Common but differentiated responsibility has 
moved from being a 芯oft" intemational legal principle to a nascent 
but increasingly robust component of intemationallaw and practice. 
To be sure, environmental cases differ from those of disaster 
and famine for many reasons, but they are particularly different 
because, in many cases, the wealthy countries clearly contribute to 
the problems and therefore share blame for them. This increases the 
IeveI of intemational obligation to distribute the means to address 
adverse environmental changes and their consequences. As such, the 
case for aid in many environmental issue areas is even stronger than 
that for disaster and famine relief. What comes from this is that 
common problems require common action, but those countr戶寸切'i
t伽h仰emη10ω‘st吋 r陀es伊~o仰n凡削削1乳叮叫‘si必S吋ωi的bi的lμity j戶or t伽h仰e problems α仰nd those 予wit的h t伽h仰e gre缸仰ω正α叫lt仿estt 
Cσpαciο伊1 to αddress t的helηmη1 hανeαn obligation to αid those less 
responsible an正fJor less αble to act. 
HIV and AIDS: 、iVill the Moral Progress Continue? 
The historical evolution of obligation toward actualizing 
intemational distributive justice shows that in a civilized world, the 
wealthy have an obligation to help those in need. This argument 
gains strength as the responsibility for problems grows-although, 
importantly, responsibility is clearly not a requirement before 
obligation exists. Thus a strong case for aid from the global rich to 
the global poor has a solid foundation not only in the c。中us of 
ethical reasoning, but also in intemational practice, as shown by, 
among other issues, the cases of disaster relief, famine aid, and 
environmental change. 
\Vi lI the response of the worId's wealthy countries toward 
HIV/AIDS in the developing world follow the historical trend of 
increasing obligation of rich to poor? There are indications that it is 
moving in this direction, and there are many arguments, both 
practical and ethical, for why it ought to. It seems to us that the 
pubIics of all countries, including those in the rich countries, are 
pushing this historical trend forward . As UN Secretary General Kofi 
56 Cf. Bicmlann, pp . 432-65 
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Anan has argued, global public opinion has pushed the developed 
country governments to start opening their wallets to assist those 
suffering from HIV/AIDS in the developing world: "there has been a 
world-九vide revolt ofpublic opinion. People no longer accept that the 
sick and dying, simply because they are poor, should be denied 
dmgs which have transformed the lives of others who are better 
off. ,, 57 It is simply becoming too diftìcult for the wealthy countries to 
resist the tide of public opinion, because the arguments for resisting 
are seldom persuasive and run counter to so many good ethical 
arguments, and historical precedents, for helping those worst 
affected and least able to help themselves . 
The (welcome) difficulty that policymakers have in resisting 
this apparent tide of public opinion may come from the basic logic 
of the norms of intemational obligation. An immense crisis exists, 
and those suffering from it lack the means to deal with it to any 
satisfactory degree. Solutions to this crisis also exist, but many of 
them (e.g. , drugs for treating AIDS , money to acquire and administer 
treatment, resources for prevention programs) are possessed by the 
wo r1d's wealthier countries. Hence, according to the logic of the 
historical trend toward greater intemational obligation between rich 
and poor, those countries with the means to provide solutions to the 
HIV/AIDS crisis, and give succor to those now suffering from it, 
have a moral obligation to ac t. What is more, people in the 
developed countries may bel ieve what some officials have been 
saying (as happened during Clinton's tenure) about the economic and 
security implications of HIV / AIDS in the poor countries for the 
developed countries . As U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell argued 
in a visit to plagued countries of Africa, AIDS "is more than a health 
issue. This is a social issue. This is a political issue. This is an 
economic issue. This in an issue ofpove口y . ，， 5 日
Having said th時， it is a curious characteristic of intemational 
aftà irs that when states are partly or largely to blame for human 
suffering beyond their borders , they are sometimes less willing to 
provide aid. 九九rhen natural disasters strike, aid is often immediate. 
But when human-induced problems arise, such as those associated 
with globaI environmental changes , action is often slow in coming, 
57 Kofi An:u丸 "Address to the African SlImmit on HIV/AIDS , Tuberculosis and Other 
Infectiolls Diseases," Abu戶， 26 April 2001 , availablc at <http:/.八九"\vw.healthnet. org/
programs/e-drug-hm:lle-drug.200 1 04/msg00097.html> 
SN Quoted in Karl Vick , "Gcncral Po\\'cll's War: AIDS in Afric丸 " Jnternationa! Hem /cl 
Trih llne , 29 Nb y 200 1 
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and many countries (especially the United States) make clear that 
their aid is charitable and does not set any precedents. Oddly, we 
seem much more willing to alleviate suffering caused by the gods 
than that caused by our own indifference, incompetence or 
mal feasance. 59 
4. HIV/AIDS and International Obligation: An Analysis 
Currently, the existence of rhetoric about the need to help poor 
countries cope with the AIDS pandemic is as plentiful as the 
resources in the developed world that could eventually be tapped 
During a speech pledging $200 million (as opposed to the $1 billion 
requested) to the new global AIDS fund called for by UN Secretary 
General Anan, President George W. Bush called the global AIDS 
cnsls lIalmost beyond comprehension. ,, 60 A few weeks later, his 
Secretary of State, during his highly publicized tour of Africa, 
proc1aimed on a visit to a Nairobi slum that it was entirely 
appropriate for him to be addressing AIDS because of its extreme 
impact on human society.61 This certainly marks an important 
turnaround from a time in the recent past when the pandemic was 
given scant attention by the developed world. Yet, ironically, 
developed countries have not only been reticent to make meaningful 
financial contributions to the problem, they have also actively 
blocked efforts by developing country governments and activists 
around the globe to provide affordable treatment options for people 
in Iow-income countries 
As we have pointed out above, an ethical viewpoint is emerging 
that developed countries have an obligation to assist poorer countries 
when certain conditions prevai l. First, a crisis exists that is causing 
considerable human suffering. Additionally, the crisis must not be 
solvable by the country(s) experiencing it and finally, the assisting 
country(s) must be able to provide useful and substantial resources 
to aid the resolution ofthe crisis. Generally speaking, the dynamic of 
AIDS-related aid from rich countries, and particularly the United 
States, has taken a course of attempting to deny each of these three 
59 lllÏs comcsωno su中risc to psychologists, \\"ho know that people do not lik巳 to admit 
blame for thcir actions, even to thcmselves-and acting to aid those who one has harmed can 
be vic叭'cd as a sclf-admission ofblamc and responsibility 
61、 Karcn DcYoung, "U.S. Givcs AIDS Fund $200 Million Donation; Bush Vows Morc Money 
for Public-Privatc Projcct," Washingloll Pω.1， 12 May 2001 
61 Karl Vicl丸 "Powell Talks of AIDS in Nairobi Slum," Washinglon Posl, 28 may 2001 
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conditions, in three overlapping stages of policy development. First 
came a period of non-recognition of the devastating impact of the 
AIDS pandemic-in essence, the denial of the need for a response 
throllgh the denial of a problem in the first place. Second, there was 
a phase of attempting to shift responsibi Iity to the developing 
countries themselves, through a set of proposals that would place 
heavier financial responsibilities on the global South and less on the 
global North. FinaIly, there has been a set of responses attempting 
to abrogate responsibility through various manifestations of the 
argument that the pandemic cannot be solved with aid from wealthy 
countries because of cultural barriers, lack of health care 
infrastrllcture and the enonnous (albeit highly in f1 ated) costs of 
antiretroviral medicationíS 
Denial has been, and continues to be, a characteristic response of 
individllals, commllnities and countries whenever and wherever 
AIDS strikes. A current extreme example of such denial is going on 
in China. There officials have dealt with infection rates as high as 
65% in areas of the Henan province by first ignoring the problem 
and then denying travel privileges to Dr. Gao Yaoj吟， who has been 
intemationaIIy recognized for her efforts on behalf of those 
infected.62 Similar1y, only very recently have many African leaders 
openly acknowledged the devastating impact of HIV in their own 
countries, and in some cOllntries, including South Africa and 
Zimbabwe, critics charge that the leadership is stiII in denia1. Thus, 
it is perhaps not sllrpnsmg that developed countries, which also 
initially responded with denial even within their own borders , should 
react similarly to the AIDS-related problems of poor countries 
、Nhat is more remarkable is the extent to which this is tme. In the 
United States officials of the CIA lobbied interna lIy for three years , 
from 1987 to 1990, just to get permission to produce a report that 
was llltimately released in 1991. The classified document, entitled 
"The Global AIDS Disaster" , predicted 45 mi l1 ion worIdwide 
infections by 2000 and yet there was no government response, even 
after portions were unclassified and released as a State Department 
white paper in 1992.63 Apathy continued during the mid-1990s 
among U.S. government bureaucracies like the Center for Disease 
6~ John Pomfret, "China Blocks Trip to U.S. by AIDS Award Honorce: Doctor Critical of 
Blood Salcs that Spread Virus ," Washinglon Posl, 30 May, 200 1 
63 Barton GelI m:m, "Death \Vatch : Thc.Global Response to AIDS in Africa : 九N'orld Shunned 
Signs of thc Corning Pbguc," Washinglοn Po.汀 ， 5 July 2000 
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Control (CDC) and Agency for International Development (USAID). 
Fear of creating unrealistic expectations and of losing budget 
autonomy, as well as the conviction that development money would 
be better spent on less expensive projects with proven results, 
contributed to the lack of activity. The governments of Westem 
Europe were similarly unresponsive.64 This denial was mirrored in 
two other sectors of society within and among developed 
countries--domestic AIDS NGOs and multinational corporations, 
specificallY those within the pharmaceutical industry. In the latter 
case, the drug companies met sporadically from 1991 to 1993 but 
appeared to reach consensus only on the idea that price discounts in 
the developing world would be a bad idea. Concluding that 
governments had the responsibility to worry about accessibility and 
distribution, that AIDS drug regimens were too complicated to be 
adapted to developing countrγconditions， and that other ba叮iers to 
treatment exist in developing countries, they suspended their talks.ω 
AIDS NGOs meanwhile, spent much of their time in the 1990s 
focusing on how to get combination drug therapies to their own 
c1 ients. Until full accessibility existed at home, they believed, 
money sent to developing countries was money that deserved to be 
spend domestical1y. 
As it became more and more difficult to deny the level of 
catastrophe wrought by AIDS in developing countries, the developed 
world began to move away from denial of the problem to a position 
(sometimes explicit, sometimes implied) that it was up to the 
developing world to bear the responsibility of its emerging health 
CflSlS . This position has taken many forms. One form consisted of 
emphasizing individual behavior. Again, this approach had been 
seen within developed countries during the early years of struggling 
with AIDS , when governments often made the argument that it was 
the responsibility of individuals to change behavior (that is, to quit 
engaging in risk behaviors). More recently, the approach has been 
used by governments in developed countries to argue that it is, again, 
individual behavior or cultural norms (such as the treatment of 
vulnerable women in developing countries) that results in the spread 
“ Onc indicator of this Iack of responsivcness is th巳 abso\utc numbcrs in foreign aid devoted 
to this prob \em by dcve\opcd countrics. An excellcnt ana\ysis is provided by Amir Attaran 
and Jcffrcy Sachs, "Dcfining and Rcfining Intcmationa\ Donor Support for Combating the 
AJDS Pandcmic," Lancet 357, 9249 (6 January 2001), pp. 57-6 1. 
的 Barton Gcllman, "An Uncqua\ Calcu\us of Life and Death," Washington Post , 27 Deccmber 
2000 
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of A1DS, and that aid from developed countries cannot change these 
factors. A second approach emphasizes the role of national leaders 
This line of argument has been particularly l1seful as a responsibility 
evasion tool by rich countries because it works in cases of both 
strong and weak national leadership on A1DS . Th l1s, when Ugandan 
President Museveni provided strong and widely doc l1mented 
attention to his country's A1DS CflSlS (and Ugandan transmission 
levels plummeted), rich countries could argue that their help was not 
needed-a cO l1ntry could tackle A1DS on its own. But with 
Zimbabwe l1nder Mugabe or，的 is more widely covered, South 
Africa under Mbe划， the argument is that it is the government, not 
lack of outside aid, that is keeping the developing country in 
question from coping with HIV / A1DS. 
Finally, and most directly, at the international level "solutions" 
have been offered that, while ostensibly aiding developing countries , 
actually place most of the costs squarely back upon them. This line 
of reasoning lies behind both World Bank and U.S. Export-1mport 
Bank offers of loans (not grants) to sl1b-Saharan African countries. 
1n both cases , the would-be Ioan agents expressed dismay at the 
negative response from developing countries. Yet they failed to 
address , or even acknowledge, the reasons behind the negative 
reaction from developing countries. The objects of the Ioan offers 
had turned them down for two reasons. First, the Ioans seemed an 
inappropriate vehicle for aid, given the fact that these same countries 
were actively campaigning for debt reIief already, and that A1DS is 
predicted to set back the economies of these cO l1ntries even further in 
the years ahead. Thus , if recipient countries cannot pay back loans 
now, why should they expect to be able to pay them back in a future 
that offers even worse economic conditions? A second weakness of 
the Ioan scheme is that developing countries correctly realized that 
they were not the only, or possibly even primary, benetìciaries of the 
loans. Rather than being able to bl1y dmgs at steeply redllced prices, 
as many developing countries have been aspiring to do, the loans 
were designed as a means to provide AIDS treatments at retail 
prices-a po1icy that would have pleased multinational 
pharmacelltical companies but drasticaIly set back the policy goals 
of developing countries 
FinaIly, we are currently experiencing the third phase (although 
aspects of 
2 月
110r that dcveloping countrics could possibly solve these problems on 
their own. Yet, rather than resulting in an acknowledgment of the 
responsibilities of the first world, a third (again multifaceted) 
defense has been raised-that the problem 站， in fact, insoluble. The 
current argument is being voiced at a time when the context of the 
debate has changed significantly since the late 1990s. Owing in very 
large pa討 to the strenuous efforts of AIDS activists and NGOs 
working in both the global North and South (and, in many cases, in 
coordinated campaigns), AIDS , and the demands of activists, have 
achieved a high level of prominence in the mainstream media. The 
Thirteenth International AIDS Conference held in Durban, South 
Africa, during June 2000 made more headlines as a forum for the 
demands of passionate and well-organized activists than as a 
showcase of international research. UN Secretary General Kofi 
Anan has pledged to address AIDS as his "personal figh t." And, in 
April 2001 , 39 of world's largest drug companies were forced to 
drop a suit against the South African government because of the 
terrible intemational press, activists were generating against them. 
The central theme of these demands has been that not only must 
future cases be averted through prevention, but tlzαt current cases 
mllst be ameliorated through treatl1lent. 
This demand is no longer even questioned within developed 
countries, where sophisticated antiretroviral treatment has been the 
standard of care since the late 1990s. Yet it is seen as widely radical 
in the context of developing countries . The first and most severe 
obstacle is cos t. ln the developed world , the combination of drugs 
(refe叮ed to as combination therapy, the "cocktail" or antiretrovirals 
[ARVs]) used to directly attack HIV replication (as opposed to 
treating the opportunistic infections it causes) retails at around 
$10,000 to $12,000 per year. And the developed world has 
consistently argued that such costs are utterly impractical for 
countries in the developing world where per capita incomes are 
many times lower than these prices. Activists have successfully 
argued, however, that the retail cost of ARVs bears little 
resemblance to their actual cost of manufacture. The manufacturing 
costs are many times less, an assertion that was given great 
credibility when generic manufacturers, beginning with the lndian 
company Cipla, offered a version of 
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manufacturers of ARVs made a major announcement in May 2000 
that they would offer steep price cuts to the developing countries 
hardest hit byAIDS.“ Although the announcements have not been 
followed with commensurate action, they actually helped to support 
the argument put forth by activists that the branded pharmaceuticals 
could, in fact, offer their products at far less cost in developing 
countries. Basing their figures on the availability of much more 
affordable generic drugs and/or deeply discounted (tiered) price 
structures, activists began to argue that funding treatment, both for 
opportunistic infections and HlV, was possible and desirable.67 
It was at this point, when documented arguments had been widely 
distributed claiming that the largest obstacle to treatment is not 
actual cost but political will (both from governments who do not feel 
1ike offering aid and pharmaceuticals who are worried about 
intellectual property rights) that a new set of arguments on the 
impossibility of treatment were launched by both the pharmaceutical 
industry and the govemments of the wealthy countries. This 
argument is that spending money on treatment would be futile 
The futility argument is based on four premises. First, opponents 
claim that ARVs could not be distributed because developing 
countries lack the health care infrastructure (hospitals, clinics, 
trained personnel , etc.) to do so. Second, they claim that the 
requirements for taking the drugs (rigorous dosing schedules, 
different combinations of drugs, with and without food or water, etc.) 
would be too onerous for people in developing countries. A third 
and reJated claim is that people in developing countries would be 
unable to adhere to these requirements and that drug-resistant strains 
would consequently develop. And, finally, they argue that treatment 
wiII be substituted for prevention, resulting in inefficient uses of 
resources and further spread of HIV. The comments of University 
of Pennsylvania bioethicist Arthur Kaplan are typical 
叭1hile drugs are an answer to the AIDS plague in North 
America and Westem Europe, they are not the solution 
for Africa and many other extremely poor nations . The 
reasons are simple. Drugs designed for people in more 
“ Michael Waldholdz, "Makcrs of AIDS Drugs Agree to Sbsh Priccs in the 甘lird World," 
w;σ11 Slrecl Journal. 11 Mav 2000 
67 The es tim~tes provided bter in this essay on the cost of financ ial assistance are predicated 
on thcsc nc\V d巴velopments in d巳creased drug pricing 
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developed cOllntries do not work as well for people 
living in countries that have no hospitals, clinics, clean 
water, sewers, roads or doctors.G8 
But advocates of treatment provision argue that these claims are 
highly exaggerated. Wh ile no one disputes that health care 
infrastructure is seriously lacking in many developing countries, they 
suggest a number of counter points. First, they point to NGOs 
inclllding Medicins Sans Frontieres and Oxfam with outstanding 
credentials regarding delivery of services in developing countries 
that have gone on record in high profile campaigns promoting 
treatment and claiming that there are many lives that could be saved 
immediately if drugs were available. They also argue that the 
experience of Brazil sugges臼 that the provision of treatment fuels 
the development of an infrastructure to deliver it 
On the issues of pill burden and dosing requirements , they argue 
that opponen臼 are working with outdated assumptions. To, for 
example, Jesse Jackson's claims that "AIDS treatment requires 20, 
30 or 40 pills a day"G9 they respond that a typical current effective 
combination requires only three J)ills twice a day and that none 
require more than 15 pills a day.70 On the related issue of drug 
adherence, both the U.S. Treasury Department and USAID head 
Andrew Nastios have recently argued that Africans cannot be 
expected to take AIDS drugs because they do not have a westem 
view of time. 71 These assertions are countered with evidence of 
programs in the Ivory Coast, Brazil and Haiti. 72 While these 
programs do not suggest that their clients are 100% compliant, 
neither do programs that exist in the developed countries, and 
proponents note, that it is hardly justifiable to argue that only rich 
countries have the right to risk drug resistance. Furthermore, these 
“ Arthur Kaplan, "Cheap Drugs Not Answer to African AIDS Crisis," MSNBC, 4 Apri12001 , 
available at <http://\v\\'\'、 ， msnbc .com/news/554660 .asp?cp1 = 1 > 
的 Jesse Jackson, quoted in Washington Pο衍， 26 March 2001 
70 Health GAP Coalition, "M)ths vs. Reality: Distortions About AIDS Drugs and the 
Developing World." 
71 ll1Ïs position has prompted strong negativc reactions on thc part of AIDS activists in both 
thc dcvelopcd and devcloping world. It has also bcen suggestcd that thc idca originally camc 
from an cpisode of thc popular Amcrican te\cvision program “Wcst Wing" that portraycd the 
fictional U.S. president attempting to broker a dcal bctween drug companies and a fictional 
African leader. For more on this hypothcsis sce John Donnelly, "Some Wondcr If Life 
Imitates Art in AIDS Policy," Boston Globe, 15 June 2001 
72 lndividual Members ofthe Harvard Facu\ty, p. 8 
28 
proponents argue, the vints has shown itself able and likely to 
mutateαbsent treatmen t. Given that successfu l1y administered 
ARVs decrease the amount of vinls within individuals, they also 
decrease the opportunity for mutations within those individuals 
Finally, treatment advocates find the claims regarding the 
substitution of treatment for prevention as perhaps the most specious 
of al l. To the contrary, they argue, treatment complements 
prevention. Not only does treatment offer an incentive for people to 
undergo voluntary testing (an extremely important consideration 
given that the vast m句ority of the wo r1d's HIV-positive people are 
not aware of their status), successful treatment lowers viral loads , 
making people less infective and less likely to pass the virus to their 
unbom and breast-fed children. Importantly, treatment advocates 
are arguing for both medicines and services to address the virus itself 
and associated communicable diseases , inclllding tuberculosis and 
sexuaIIy transmitted diseases, which both make individuals more 
vulnerable to becoming infected with HIV and to progressing to 
AIDS . Thus, treatment can prevent other illnesses as wel 1. Final1y, 
treatment, by prolonging the lives of adults, prevents the creation of 
yet more orphans, an enormous consideration for countries already 
reeling with the additional burden of thousands (and on the global 
scale millions) of children with no source of support or care. 
A vast increase in aid to developing countries to deal with their 
AIDS crises would go a long way toward providing treatment and 
prevention , and toward ameliorating some of the worst effects of the 
cnsls. It would also be easily affordable for the developed wo r1d 
The estimates of what would be required vary. UNAIDS Director 
Peter Piot originally suggested $3 billion annllally as a minimal 
response to "tum the tide of the epidemic." 73 That estimate 
specifically excluded the possibility of antiretroviral treatments, but 
some future estimates include them in their numbers. Secretary 
General Koft Anan has called for a global fund (to also include 
treatment for malaria and tuberculosis) of $7 to $10 billion; the 
Harvard Consensus statement estimates a need for $1 .4 bi l1 ion 
initiaIIy, moving to $4.2 billion in five years; and the Global AIDS 
73 UNAIDS Press Releasc, "UNAIDS Calls on G8 for Massi\"e Increase in Resources to Fight 
AIDS ," 20 July 2000 avaibble at <http ://ww\\" .unaids .org./whatsne\vs/press/eng/ 
pressarcOO/gcncva200700. html>. 
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Alliance calls for $15 billion. 7~ Each of these estimates usually 
assume that the United States should contribute approximately 25% 
of the total, with the rest coming from other developed countries, 
and in some cases, private corporations. Although aIl but the 
smaIIest of these estimates would require at least a tenfold increase 
in the level of assistance from developed countries, such an increase 
is easily affordable. In calling for the original $3 biIIion, for 
instance, UNAIDS Director Piot compared that figure to the $52 
bi Il ion that U.S . citizens spend annuaIIy fighting obesity. 75 
Harvard's Jeffrey Sachs often points out that for the United States to 
pay its portion of the Harvard estimates it would only cost $8 per 
person, or less than the cost of one movie with popcorn per year 
Although the costs for the developed world would be smaII, the 
costs of not acting for both the developing and the developed world 
are potentialIy enormous. Despite this protracted pattem of dodging 
its obIigations regarding HIV/AIDS in developing countries, the 
developed worId has conceded rhetoricaIly that there are strong 
practical reasons for helping to tum the tide of this global 
catastrophe. In the United States, for instance, the Clinton 
administration officiaIly pronounced the globaI pandemic a national 
security threat. More broadly, AIDS in developing countries is not 
only destroying individual Iives , it is destroying whole societies. 
Thinking, for example, about the explosive growth in the orphan 
population should give the worId cause for alarm. There are 
cu叮ently estimated to be 12 million children orphaned by AIDS in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and absent significant intervention, that number 
is expected to grow to 40 million by 2010.76 Most of these children 
wiII reach adulthood without formaI education, parental role 
modeling or significant ski Ils developmen t. Lacking these abi Iities 
and attributes, how wi Il they be able to take on the work and family 
responsibiIities necessary for national stabiIity? This is only one of 
many ways in which AIDS is undermining the economies and civil 
societies of African countries. In a forum sponsored by the Institute 
for Peace, intemational researchers and intelligence experts warned 
74 For discussion of thcsc cstimates , sce Eric Friedman and Paul Zci位， "Estimating the Costs 
for an Expandcd and Comprehcnsive HIV/AIDS Response in Sub-Saharan Africa," 
Discussion Mcmorandum, 28 March 2001 , and Individual Members ofth巳 Harvard Faculty 
口 Quoted in Joc Lauria, "AIDS Study Cites Dire African Necd, $3 B Rcmedy," Bos/on Globe, 
29 No\"ember 2000 
76 See John Donnclly, "Suddenly a Plan to Treat AIDS in Afric丸" Bos/on Globe, 13 February 
2001 
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of dire consequences, including a decrease in the GDP of sub-
Saharan countries of as much as 20% over the next two decades, and 
the potential for extreme political instabi1ity and ethnic tension 
Equally worrying, they also suggested that some of these problems 
could occur in India as wel l. 77 As economies plunge and 
governments fail , the developed wo r1d will be forced to expend 
resources on peacekeeping and stabi1ization efforts that could have 
been staved off with far fewer resources, and certainly much less 
human suffering, by providing assistance for the root problem of 
AIDS . 
5. Conclusion 
The HIV/AIDS crisis presents the world with profound moral and 
practical challenges. It is also one of greatest manifestations of 
human suffering ever witnessed, largely because the vast majority of 
those suffering directly and indirectly from HIV/AIDS live (and die) 
in the world's poorest countries . Yet the response to this crisis by the 
world's wealthy countries has been altogether lacking. They have at 
least now acknowledged the problem, and they have started to 
provide some help. However, their response remains weak and 
miniscule relative to the scale of the problem, and some 
governments and businesses continue to resist doing much at al l. We 
have argued that this needs tφ-and ought to-change. Indeed, there 
are many ethical , practical and historical justifications for developed 
countries to provide far more help in preventing HIV transmission 
and caring for those suffering from AIDS throughout the world, not 
just at home. For many ethical reasons , it is unfair and inequitable to 
deny further aid . For practical reasons , it is in the interests of 
developed countries to provide greater assistance. And history shows 
that our modem , civilized international society requires the world's 
wealthy to aid the world's poor when they are in need and when help 
can be provided. That the wo r1 d's poor are in need in this case is 
undeniable , and we have shown that provision of aid is possible 
Hence, we mllst concl l1de that fllrther delay not only rllns counter to 
the interests of al1 those who suffer from HIV / AIDS , as well as those 
indirectly affected al1 over the world, but that it is immoral and 
contradicts historical trends and well-established norms of 
77 Reuters Health, "CiviI War Looms Unless Poor Countries Get ReIief From AIDS ," 8 May 
200! avaibblc at <http ://\\ww.medscapc,com/reuters/prof/200 1l05/05 .09/200! 050Spub lO02 
11tm!> 
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intemational obligation. The case for denying aid is now very hard 
to make; the case for doing much more is overwhelming. 
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Professor Joachim Wagner and 
Dr. Xiangdong Wei 
Professor Lok-sang Ho 
Ms . Annie H. N . Chan 
M r. Hong-kin Kwok and 
M r. Shing-tak Chan 
Dr. Brian BridgeS 
Professor James C. Hsiung 
Dr. William Lee and 
Professor John Edwards 
Professor James C. Hsiung 
Dr. Beatrice Leung 
Professor Lok-sang Ho 
張曙光教授
趙人偉教授 、 李寶教授
Dr. Hiro\llki Imai 
Dr. Ping Lin and 
Dr. Kamal Saggi 
Profcssor Lok-sang Ho 
Professor Lok-sang Ho 
Dr. Oi-ling Siu, 
Professor Paul E. Spector, 
Professor Cary L. Cooper, 
Dr. Kate Sparks and 
Dr. Ian Donald 
No. 王盟主 Author 
91 (3月~) CAPS A Comparatiyc Study of Managcrial Strcss in Grcatcr Dr. Oi-ling Siu, 
China: The Dircct and Indirect Effccts of Coping Profcssor Paul E. Spector, 
Strategies and Work Locus ofControl Professor Cary L. Cooper, 
Dr. Luo Lu and 
Dr. Shanfa Yu 
92 (4/99) CPPS Implementing E伍cient Allocations in a Model of Professor Edward J. Grccn and 
Financiallntcnnediation Dr. Ping Lin 
93 (5/99) CPPS R & 0 lncentivcs in Vertically Related Industries Dr. Samiran Bancljee and 
Dr. Ping Lin 
94 (6月9) CAPS Testing for a Nonlincar Relationship anlong Dr. Yuc Ma al1d 
Fundamcntals and Exchangc R.,tcs in thc ElUvl Dr. AngcJos Kωla5 
95 (7/99) CPPS Health Carc Dclivery and Financing: in Search of an Professor Lok-sang Ho 
Ideal Model . Reflections on the Harvard Report 
96 (8/99) CPPS A Structural Equation Model ofEnvironmental Attitude Dr. Oi-ling Siu and 
and Behaviour: Thc Hong Kong Expericnce Dr. Kui-yin Cheung 
97 (9月9) CAPS Hong Kong's In f1ation under the U.S. Dollar Peg: The Dr. Hiroyuki Imai 
Balassa-Samuelson E缸cct or the Dutch Disease? 
98 (1/00) CAPS Structural Transfonllation and Economic Gro\\th in Dr. Hiroyuki Imai 
Hong Kong: Anothcr Look at Young's “A Tale ofTwo 
Cities" 
99 (2/00) CAPS Corporatism and Civil Society in the People's Republic Dr. Wong Yiu-chung and 
of China: Empirical Evidcncc and Theoretical Dr. Chan Che-po 
Implications 
100 (3/00) CAPS Globalization and Sino-Arnerican Economic Relations Professor C. Fred Bergsten 
\01 (4/00)CPPS Govcmmcnt Expcnditurcs and Equilibrium Real Professor Ronald J. Ba\vcrsωld 
Exchange Rates Dr. Jeffrey H. Bergstrand 
102 (5/00)CPPS A Case Study of Economic Ecology: The Hong Kong Profcssor Lok-sang Ho 
Economy's Plungc into a Dcep Recession in 1998 
103 (6/00) CPPS Incentives and Corruption in Chinesc Economic Refonll Dr. Chengze Simon Fan and 
Professor Hersche\ 1. Grossman 
104 (7/00) CPPS Safety Climatc and Employee Health Arnong B\ue Collar Dr. Oi-ling Siu, Dr. lan Donald, 
Workcrs in Hong Kong and China: Age and Gender Profcssor David R. Phillipsωld 
Differences Mr. Billy Kwok-hung Shc 
105 (8/00) CPPS The Political Economy ofHong Kong SAR's Fiscal Profcssor Lok-sang Ho 
Policy 
No. 主盟k A"thor 
1 06 (9/00) CPPS A Two-\vave Trend Study ofOrganizational Climate and Dr. Oi-ling Siu 
Psychological Distress among General and Psychiatric 
Nurses in Hong Kong 
107 (1101) CPPS Realistic Exchange Rates : A Post-Asian Financial Crisis Professor Lok-sang Ho 
Perspective 
108 (2/01) CPPS Health Car巴 Financing and Delivery in Hong Kong: What Professor Lok-sang Ho 
Should Be Done 
109 (3/01) CPPS The 丸iVorld Currency Unit: Can it Work? Professor Lok-sang Ho 
110 (4/01) CPPS Strategic Spin-O叮s Dr. Ping Lin 
111 (5/01) CPPS Downstream R&D, Raising Rivals' Costs, and Input Dr. Samiran Ban吋ee and 
Price Contract Dr. Ping Lin 
112 (6/01) CPPS Ecology and Foreign Policy: Theoretical Lessons from Dr. John Barkdull and 
the Literature Dr. Pau1 G. Harris 
113 (7/01) CPPS Evolving Norrns ofNorth-South Assistance: Will 訂ley Dr. Pau1 G. Harris and 
be Applied to HIV/AlDS? Dr. Patricia Siplon 
A fulllist ofworking papers titles is also available at the Centre homepages : http ://\'叭叭，v .LN .edu .hk/caps/ and 
h位p://www.LN . edu .hk/cpps/
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